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RUMOR CONTROL AND DISCLOSURE OF MERGER
NEGOTIATIONS OR OTHER CONTROL-RELATED
TRANSACTIONS: FULL DISCLOSURE OR
"NO COMMENT"-THE ONLY
SAFE HARBORS
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The active market for corporate acquisitions has had numerous
ramifications with regard to both state corporate law and federal se-
curities law. Over the past several years a major issue confronting
management of public issue corporations has been the disclosure
obligations attendant to on-going merger negotiations. This issue
usually arises when management attempts to frame an appropriate
response to inquiries concerning unusual price or volume move-
ment in the company's stock or, alternatively, to questions concern-
ing rumored takeover activity. The federal securities laws approach
such disclosure problems in terms of whether a statement is materi-
ally misleading. A delicate balance must be struck between inves-
tors' access to relevant market information and management's
desire for secrecy. Corporate managements have a legitimate inter-
est in not disclosing a possible transaction in its preliminary stages
lest the disclosure interfere with the progress of the negotiations.
On the other side of the balance is the availability of accurate infor-
mation that is necessary for an efficient market.
The discussion below focuses on both the best timing and de-
gree of detail in merger negotiation disclosure, as well as the viabil-
ity of a safe harbor rule that would guide management in such
situations. It is suggested herein that the only alternative to full and
fair disclosure of the stage of negotiations, regardless of how pre-
liminary, is to issue a "no comment" statement.
This discussion begins with a description of the relevant market
environment. It is followed by a brief overview of the provisions of
the federal securities laws that bear upon whether a particular dis-
closure is appropriate. The subsequent analysis of the materiality
issue, particularly in terms of the merger negotiation and rumor
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., Columbia
University, 1969;J.D., 1972.
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control cases, will demonstrate that rigid rules cannot capture the
current state of the law. Since the materiality of a particular item is
highly factual, dependent upon the surrounding circumstances, it is
not possible to craft a safe harbor rule that would give clear guide-
lines to management as to what may and may not be said. A safe
harbor, short of full disclosure or "no comment," would result in an
unfortunate redefinition of traditional concepts of disclosure and
materiality, and would permit half-truths that can mislead investors.
II. MERGERS AND THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT-
AN INEFFICIENT MARKET
Beginning in the 1960s, investors' focus on corporate combina-
tions has had a significant impact on the securities markets both in
terms of day-to-day trading tactics and the markets' overall com-
plexion.1 The cloak of secrecy under which many takeovers, both
hostile and friendly, took place led Congress to impose federal reg-
ulation of tender offers through enactment of the Williams Act in
1968.2 The major thrust of the Williams Act, as is the case with the
securities acts generally, is disclosure in order to assure an informed
market.3
In the past several years the securities markets have witnessed
what might best be described as "merger mania." During this pe-
riod hostile third-party tender offers have proliferated. Both actual
and potential takeover candidates have sought friendly suitors, or
"white knights," as one of the many defensive tactics available.4
These friendly combinations, in turn, have supplied additional froth
to an already frothy market for control of public issue companies.
Investors have a strong incentive for a short-term investment in or-
1. See generally E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977); R. PHALON, THE TAKEOVER BARONS OF WALL
STREET: INSIDE THE BILLION DOLLAR MERGER GAME (1981). See also Leebrom, Games
Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153 (1986).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2,3, 82 Stat. 454, 454-57 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). See generally Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Of-
fers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969); Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15
N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969).
3. See generally T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 11.10-.20 (1985 &
Supp. 1987).
4. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980); Lipton & Brown-
stein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAw. 1403
(1985); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979); Warden,
The Boardroom as a WVar Room: The Real World Applications of the Duty of Care and the Duty of
Loyalty, 40 Bus. LAw. 1431 (1985). See also Leebrom, supra note 1, at 216-18.
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der to take advantage of extraordinarily high control premiums and,
thereby, to realize huge profits by purchasing stock before the issuer
has been "put into play." 5 Accordingly, investors have created in
the market an increased focus on trying to identify takeover candi-
dates. Investors' hunger for "deals" has carried over beyond the
market for corporate control in the context of business combina-
tions. Other transactions that frequently result in high premiums in-
clude corporate restructuring and taking a public company private
through a merger, reverse stock split, or repurchase of its shares.6
This new-found emphasis on potential control premiums-and
other deal-related premiums-takes investors' emphasis away from
the company's long-term prospects, in favor of a search for compa-
nies likely to be targets in the near future.
The short-term emphasis on the takeover, corporate restructur-
ing, and going private markets, combined with investors' ignorance
as to takeovers and mergers in their early planning stages, has led to
volatile markets that are significantly affected by rumors. Such an
environment is antithetical to the ideal of an efficient capital mar-
ket.7 Under the efficient capital market hypothesis, the market price
reflects an evaluation of all publicly available information, including
any material misinformation.8 In addition to the misinformation
and rumors that may exist, market efficiency is severely hampered
by the current environment of investors searching for deal-related
stocks. This is in large part due to the furor over takeovers and the
5. Once a pending takeover has been announced, other potential acquirers may
enter the field. When a target company has been identified, it is said to be "in play."
6. These transactions can arise as a result of management's initiative, or they can be
in response to or in anticipation of a third-party takeover offer.
7. See, e.g., J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 651-61 (1979); J.
LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 56, 65 (2d ed.
1985); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970); Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212
(1972); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and Regulation of the
Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). For critical views of the efficient capital
market hypothesis, see Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Se-
curities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market
Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986). See also Givoly & Lakonishok, The Infor-
mation Content of Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: Some Evidence on Semi-Strong Ineffi-
ciency, 1 J. AcCT. & ECON. 165 (1979); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers:
A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 276-89 (1983).
8. As one court has summarized the efficient capital market hypothesis:
"[E]conomists have now amassed sufficient empirical data to justify a present belief that
widely-followed securities of larger corporations are 'efficiently' priced: the market
price of stocks reflects all available public information-and hence necessarily, any mate-
rial misrepresentations as well." In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
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fact that the market is placing an extraordinarily high premium on
takeover and, in some cases, liquidation values.
The stock market is so starved for "deals" that it does not seem
to be acting either rationally or efficiently. Many investors are put-
ting unusually high emphasis on finding takeover candidates; this
emphasis is magnified by the activities of risk arbitragers. In addi-
tion, many individuals and corporations acquiring the target compa-
nies seem to be engaged in a game akin to Monopoly: they acquire
businesses with a view to a quick profit, and then resell within a rela-
tively short period of time if the results are disappointing. For ex-
ample, consider two recent case histories. In one instance, two
major consumer products companies merged, only to have manage-
ment decide that the merger should be undone. Within a few years
after the merger the companies split up.9 In a second and similar
development, a major consumer products company has divested it-
self of a recently acquired liquor and wine company.' These two
instances arguably show that even the corporate takeover market is
not geared to the long term.
The stock of a number of public companies is trading far below
the liquidation value. When a sizable number of companies are
worth substantially more in terms of their break-up value as com-
pared with their going-concern value, it is difficult to concede that
the market is in fact efficient. Another example of the market's inef-
ficiency and investors' hunger for stocks seen as having the potential
for involvement in future deals is the immediate reaction to insider
trading scandals. Precipitous declines in takeover-sensitive stocks
have followed recent SEC enforcement'actions with respect to in-
sider trading." Thus, we are operating in an environment in which
the quest for the quick profit and rapid turn-around is acting at
cross purposes with an efficient market. The current speculative
and unstable environment makes it imperative that companies fol-
low responsible disclosure policies when dealing with merger nego-
tiations or market rumors.
The widespread presence of takeover rumors can, of course,
have the effect of injecting misinformation into the market. The
9. Kraft merged with Dart Industries only to split up a few years later in November
of 1986.
10. A few years ago, RJR Corp. acquired Heublein, Inc., and now, subsequent to
RJR's merger with Nabisco, the Heublein division is being sold.
11. This was the market's reaction to the settlement involving Ivan Boesky. See Wall
St.J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6; see also id., Nov. 19, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (market plunges
amid rumor of deepening probe); id., Nov. 20, 1986, at 3, col. 2 (takeover stocks take big
tumble, hurting speculators).
1987] 957
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
misinformation increases when people perceived to be knowledge-
able and informed are less than fully candid in their public pro-
nouncements. The problem here is not so much the absence of
information as to merger negotiations, but rather the presence of
half-truths that corporate spokespersons disseminate. While total si-
lence may be justified as a matter of sound business policy, the injec-
tion of half-truths 2 and misinformation into the marketplace
cannot.1
3
Additional forces have enhanced market inefficiency in the cur-
rent environment. Although unrelated to the public market for cor-
porate control, the proliferation of options and financial index
futures has further focused the market on the short term rather than
the long term. Computer-generated buy programs and sell pro-
grams, frequently tied into the index options and futures markets,
further exacerbate the problem. The resulting high volume and vol-
atility magnify the inefficiency of the market generally and for cor-
porate control specifically. It is ironic that these relatively new
financial investments, which were designed to increase market effi-
ciency, appear to have had quite the opposite effect. While the dis-
cussion below does not address the problems raised by index
futures and options, their impact must be recognized as further
compounding the problems raised by the current speculative fever
over potential takeover, restructuring, and going private candidates.
There has been much concern over how best to maintain the
securities markets as a source of informed investments rather than
an arena for frothy and largely uninformed speculation. There have
been many calls for new regulation of the takeover markets at both
the federal and state level-ranging from tighter controls on defen-
sive tactics' 4 to regulation of the structure of takeovers. 5 While
12. It has aptly been observed that "[flragmentary information may be as misleading
... as active misrepresentation, and half-truths may be as actionable as whole lies ......
Kannavos v. Annino, 356 Mass. 42, 48, 247 N.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1969) (quoting 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14, at 586-87 (1956)). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 529, at 62-63 (1976); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 7.14, at 472 (2d ed. 1986); 12 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§§ 1497-1499 (3d ed. 1970).
13. But see Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1987); Note, Disclo-
sure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations, 8 CARDoZo L. REV. 197, 217 (1986).
14. Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law-A Proposal for a National Policy Concerning Tender Offer
Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 303 (1986); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Siegel,
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 377 (1985).
15. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(f)(8)-(11), .14d-10 (1986), which mandate fair prices
in two-tiered offers and prohibit exclusionary tender offers.
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structural reforms would address the unfairness that results from
certain types of transactions, they do not affect the problem ad-
dressed herein: the placing of effective limits on the infusion of
half-truths and misinformation into the marketplace. Further, while
we await the eventual resolution of the various proposed reforms,
issuers and the courts continue to struggle with the extent of disclo-
sure obligations by issuers who are, or may be, subject to takeovers,
or who are engaged in takeover negotiations.
III. DISCLOSURE OR SILENCE?
As pointed out above, nearly twenty years after the passage of
the Williams Act, significant disclosure problems remain in the mar-
ket for corporate control. In fact, since the Williams Act is triggered
only by a tender offer 16 or the acquisition of five percent of a class of
a target company's equity securities," its provisions do not apply to
mergers or other forms of combination except in connection with a
tender offer or five-percent purchase. Other provisions of the fed-
eral securities acts, however, do have an impact. Mergers involving
companies subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 can be accomplished only after a shareholder
vote that will be subject to full disclosure under the federal proxy
regulation."8 Also, by virtue of the SEC's "going private rule," 9
transactions that result in the cessation of Exchange Act reporting
requirements are subject to similar disclosures. All of the foregoing
provisions focus on the accuracy of the disclosures once the transac-
tion begins. The proxy and going private regulations generally do
not bear directly upon the problem addressed herein-what to do in
the face of preliminary merger, corporate restructuring, or going
private discussions.
Over the past several years the courts and the SEC have begun
to grapple with the issue of disclosure obligations in the face of ac-
tual or rumored merger negotiations. Although the Williams Act's
16. Section 14(d) imposes filing requirements with regard to tender offers for target
companies that are subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1982). Section 14(e) prohibits deceptive conduct as well as material misstatements in
connection with a tender offer, regardless of whether the target is a 1934 Act reporting
company. Id. § 78n(e). With respect to self-tender offers by issuers, see § 13(e) of the
Williams Act, id. § 78m(e).
17. Id. § 78m(d). This provision is limited to target company securities subject to
the 1934 Act reporting requirements. See also id. § 78m(e) (addressing issuer repur-
chases of its own shares).
18. Id. § 78n(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1986).
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general antifraud provision may have some impact,2" the primary
impetus for full disclosure in such situations is SEC rule lOb-5. 2"
Additionally, other federal provisions may come into play. 2 As will
be explained more fully below, the courts and the SEC have been
attempting to find a solution to the problem of deciding at what
point an issuer is under an obligation to disclose the existence of
pending negotiations that might lead to a transfer of corporate
control.
The problem can arise in two different types of transactions.
First, issuers that have put their business up for sale, that are engag-
ing in takeover talks, or that are investigating a restructuring or go-
ing private transaction must decide at what time information should
be released as a result of their own initiative. This determination
necessarily involves the exercise of sound business judgment and a
balancing between the desire for secrecy and the shareholders' and
other investors' need to know. Second, issuers must be prepared to
respond to questions from the securities exchanges themselves,23
the press, the public, or security analysts. Questions directed at cor-
porate management frequently will be spurred by volatile price and
volume movements in the company's stock or the presence of ru-
mors. In such situations management does not have the alternative
of absolute silence unless management is able to hide from all ques-
tioners. Similarly, disclosure problems can arise when a company is
meeting with security analysts at a time when undisclosed prelimi-
nary takeover talks are taking place. In each of these instances, re-
sponses must be carefully worded in order to avoid making
20. Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77n(e) (1982). See infra text accompanying
notes 41-42.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
22. For example, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which was the basis for rule lOb-5's lan-
guage, prohibits material misstatements, fraudulent conduct, and conduct that operates
as a fraud in connection with the offer or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
This is in contrast to rule lOb-5, which applies in connection with both purchases and
sales. Second, rule 14a-9, which requires full disclosure in the solicitation of proxies for
issuers subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements, would apply when the merger
negotiations are taking place during proxy season. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986). Third,
§ 14(e) prohibits material misstatements and deceptive conduct in connection with a
tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
23. See Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing
Negotiations, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 93 (1986); Note, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotia-
tions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 197 (1986); Note, Stock Exchange Inquiry: Problems with Disclosure
of Preliminary Merger or Acquisition Negotiations, 11J. CORP. L. 715 (1986); Comment, Corpo-
rate Disclosure of Merger Negotiations- When Does the Investor Have a Right to Know?, 36 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1155 (1985); Comment, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations Under
Rule lOb-5, 62 WASH. L. REv. 81 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Disclosure].
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materially misleading pronouncements. It is suggested herein that
"no comment" is the only safe response as an alternative to full dis-
closure. A "no comment" response is preferable to the misleading
"no corporate development" statement in the face of pending
negotiations.24
It should be pointed out that even full disclosure of preliminary
negotiations has the potential for being misperceived and inaccu-
rately (or inefficiently) evaluated by the market. If discussions are at
a preliminary stage, any disclosure has the potential for being re-
ceived by the market more optimistically than warranted because of
the current unlimited thirst for takeover candidates. Nevertheless,
carefully worded, full and accurate disclosures indicating the prelim-
inary nature of the talks would not be actionable under the securi-
ties laws even if misperceived by an inefficient market.
Thus, in theory, an issuer can always fully disclose the nature
and stage of the preliminary talks that are taking place. In many
cases, however, there is the fear that premature disclosure would
severely impede negotiations if not operate as a "show stopper." As
SEC Commissioner Grundfest has pointed out, "Clearly, merger ne-
gotiations cannot be conducted in a fishbowl."2 5 The same is true
of discussions relating a possible restructuring or going private
transaction. Furthermore, there is a question as to whether a disclo-
sure of preliminary discussions presents a duty to update. 26 Accord-
ingly, full disclosure of negotiations may not be a practical
alternative when a transaction is in its early stages.
A frequently suggested solution is that the SEC formulate a safe
harbor rule governing both statements made in the course of pre-
liminary negotiations and disclosures designed to control rumors.27
In theory at least, a safe harbor rule dealing with the materiality is-
sue would solve the dilemma that managements currently face.
Contrary to the position taken by other commentators, including
Commissioner Grundfest, however, it is submitted herein that, in
lieu of full disclosure, the only safe harbor that would operate with-
out changing the existing law of materiality is "no comment. "28
24. See Brown, supra note 23; Comment, Disclosure, supra note 23, at 104.
25. Grundfest, Carnation Revisited: Toward an Optimal Merger Disclosure and Rumor Re-
sponse Policy, Address to the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar
Association (Apr. 15, 1986), at 11.
26. See id. at 8-9.
27. See id. at I I-12.
28. But see Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating
that "no comment" can be misleading).
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Further, any other safe harbor, even if capable of a concise formula-
tion, would operate contrary to the interest of market efficiency.
IV. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE DISCLOSURE STATUTES
At this point, it may be helpful to give a brief overview of the
various securities law provisions that are applicable to disclosure of
preliminary merger negotiations, and that would trigger the duty to
disclose the negotiations, or alternatively, to issue a "no comment"
response. As mentioned above, SEC rule lOb-529 is the provision
with broadest applicability to disclosures in the merger negotia-
tion/rumor control context, although, on appropriate facts, other
provisions may come into play.
A. SEC Rule 10b-5: An Overview
Rule lOb-5 prohibits materially misleading statements made in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security, regardless of
whether that security is subject to the registration requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.30 Rule lOb-5 jurisdiction de-
pends upon the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 3 '
With regard to the "in connection with" requirement, it is not nec-
essary that the defendant in the rule lOb-5 action have been a pur-
chaser or seller of securities since it is sufficient that the statement,
when made, was reasonably calculated to affect purchases and sales.
Since a reporter's or analyst's question generally is triggered by un-
usual market activity or rumors, the "in connection with" require-
ment is easily satisfied in the typical situation involving actual or
rumored merger negotiations.
Rule lOb-5 is promulgated under section 10(b), which prohibits
manipulative or deceptive conduct. 32 The Supreme Court has held
that scienter must be shown as a precondition to a violation.33 In
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986).
30. Companies are subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements if their securities
are traded on a national securities exchange, or, alternatively, if they have more than five
million dollars in assets and a class of equity securities with more than five hundred
shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1986).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). See Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 873-74
(10th Cir. 1982); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 644 (5th Cir. 1975); Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718, 727 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
33. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1977). See generally Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in the Post-Hochfelder
Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1977); Bucklo,
The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule IOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
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addition to the scienter requirement, a private suit for damages can
only be brought by someone who was a purchaser or seller of the
securities in question and who was injured as a result of the materi-
ally misleading statement.34 Another precondition to a violation of
rule lOb-5 is that there have been some element of deception; mere
unfairness or breach of state law duties will not suffice.3 5
B. SEC Rule lOb-5: When Does an Affirmative Obligation Arise?
Whether an omission can ever be actionable by itself raises an
interesting issue under rule lOb-5. 3 6  The rule, in addition to
prohibiting misstatements, makes it unlawful "to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading .... ,,3' As
such, the rule on its face contemplates that the omission be from a
statement that has been made. Accordingly, it is generally assumed
that absent a statement, other affirmative conduct, 8 or a fiduciary
duty,39 there is no affirmative duty of disclosure. In the words of a
recent decision holding that pending merger negotiations need not
be disclosed: "Absent a specific duty to disclose, even the most ma-
terial information imaginable may be withheld from the public." 40
The view that mere nondisclosure will not support a rule lOb-5
violation is supported by the traditional common law of fraud and
deceit." Although the courts have developed various exceptions to
STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977); Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of
Its Impact Upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977).
34. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975).
35. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). See generally Ferrara &
Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
263 (1980). Cf. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that manip-
ulation alone will not support a violation of § 14(e) of the Williams Act; some element of
misrepresentation or deception is required).
36. See Bauman, Rule IOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J.
935 (1979); Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information Con-
cerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAw. 1243 (1985).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
38. For example, corporate insiders in possession of material nonpublic information
are under an alternative obligation to disclose or abstain from trading. See generally T.
HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 13.9. Accordingly, a duty to disclose arises when such persons
decide to trade in their company's shares.
39. E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 232 (1980).
40. Polak v. Continental Hosts, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also
Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); T. HAZEN, supra
note 3, at § 13.10.
41. E.g., Hendrick v. Lynn, 37 Del. Ch. 402, 144 A.2d 147 (1958); Fegeas v. Sherrill,
218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958); Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 311 Mass. 677,42
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the rule of no liability for mere nondisclosure, they are as yet very
ill-defined.42 While the common law of fraud has recognized a fidu-
ciary duty exception to the absence of liability for mere nondisclo-
sure,13 it does not, absent special facts, apply to the nondisclosure
of merger negotiations.4 4
Accordingly, there seems little, if any, basis for the proposition
that rule lOb-5 imposes an affirmative disclosure obligation. 45 As
the Second Circuit has pointed out: "A company has no duty to
correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless those rumors can
be attributed to the company. ' '46 In contrast to rule lOb-5, the
guidelines established by both the New York and American Stock
Exchanges require corporations to make timely disclosure of infor-
mation material to the reasonable investor.47 In applying the ex-
change requirements, the company is entitled to establish business
reasons for not disclosing. Thus, for example, in the context of pre-
liminary merger negotiations, secrecy can be justified as necessary
to permit discussions to go forward. Violation of the exchange's
disclosure guidelines might warrant some disciplinary action, but it
is questionable whether it would amount to a lOb-5 violation, even
if made with scienter.
In contrast to the stock exchange approach, the SEC periodic
reporting requirements, except in very limited circumstances not
applicable to preliminary merger negotiations, do not impose an ob-
ligation to disclose information as it becomes material to investors.
The closest affirmative disclosure requirement is found in SEC form
8K, which must be filed by companies subject to the registration and
periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
N.E.2d 808 (1942); Iron City Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, Du Puy & Co., 194 Pa. 205, 44 A.
1066 (1899); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 737-38 (5th ed. 1984)[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
42. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, § 106, at 738-40.
43. E.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (discussing
duty of majority shareholder to disclose to minority shareholder in connection with
stock redemption to be followed by liquidation); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41,
§ 106, at 738-39.
44. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
45. See T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 13.10.
46. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981)
(relying on Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1980); Elec-
tronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969)).
Accord Etshokin v. Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (N.D. Il. 1984); Zuckerman
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
47. N.Y.S.E. Listed Company Manual, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,121, 23,513
(1977); AMEX Disclosure Policies §§ 401, 402, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,124A-
124B (1977).
964 [VOL. 46:954
FULL DISCLOSURE OR "No COMMENT"
1934.4' Form 8K requires timely disclosure of certain material
events, including the acquisition or disposition of substantial assets
or changes in control.4 9 It also requires disclosure upon the con-
summation of the transaction. 5' Thus, form 8K does not mandate
disclosure of negotiations, at least until they have been completed
and the deal has been finalized.
The apparent absence of an affirmative disclosure obligation
imposed by rule lOb-5 and the correlative rule of no liability for
mere nondisclosure presents its own safe harbor: silence or no
comment. In the typical merger negotiation situation, management
is responding to a question and, thus, can avoid lOb-5 scrutiny only
by silence, which can take the form of a "no comment" statement.
C. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
In addition to rule lOb-5, which has the broadest application,
there are other securities law provisions that may come into play on
appropriate facts. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 51
which was the model for SEC rule lOb-5, prohibits material mis-
statements "in the offer or sale" of securities.52 Although the courts
are divided as to the existence of a private remedy under section
17(a),53 the Supreme Court has held that a showing of negligence is
sufficient to support a finding that a material misstatement is in vio-
lation thereof.51 Under the broadest reading of section 17(a)'s "in
connection with" requirement, its proscriptions would apply when-
ever a statement is reasonably calculated to affect decisions made in
connection with sales of securities. Under such a reading, section
17(a) would have the same application as rule lOb-5 to management
statements issued in connection with merger negotiations, corpo-
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (1986).
49. Other required form 8K disclosures include director resignations and changes in
the issuer's certified public accountant acting as auditor. In addition to the required
disclosures, an issuer may use form 8K to disclose any other information that it deems
material and worthy of disclosure. Form 8K, item 5. The item 5 disclosures are purely
voluntary.
50. Form 8K provides in relevant part: "If the registrant or any of its majority-
owned subsidiaries has acquired or disposed of a significant amount of assets, otherwise in
the ordinary course of business, [it must] furnish the following information .... Form
8K, item 2 (emphasis added).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
52. The Supreme Court has indicated that § 17(a)'s "in the offer or sale" language is
equivalent to rule lOb-5's "in connection with" requirement. United States v. Naftalin,
441 U.S. 768, 773 n.4 (1979).
53. See T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 13.13.
54. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
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rate restructuring, going private, or rumor control; section 17(a)
would arguably be applicable since such statements are likely to af-
fect investment decisions. Such a broad reading arguably is inap-
propriate, however, since it would negate the impact of rule lOb-5's
scienter requirement. Perhaps a more acceptable reading of section
17(a)'s "in connection with" requirement would be to limit its appli-
cability to management statements reasonably calculated to affect
offers or sales of securities by management or by the corporation.
Under this reading, section 17(a) would have a relatively narrow ap-
plication to disclosure issues relating to merger negotiations or ru-
mor control.
D. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Proxy Rules
When preliminary merger negotiations are undertaken in con-
junction with or in response to a third-party tender offer, section
14(e) of the Exchange Act 55 may come into play. Section 14(e) ap-
plies 1Ob-5 type disclosure requirements to statements made in con-
nection with a tender offer. As is the case with rule lOb-5, section
14(e) applies regardless of whether or not the target corporation is a
reporting company. Thus, once a tender offer has been com-
menced, any statement made by the target company's management
(or anyone else, for that matter) will be subject to section 14(e) scru-
tiny. While it is clear that competing tender offerors do not have
standing to bring private damage suits under section 14(e), 56 it re-
mains to be resolved whether such an action can be maintained by a
shareholder of the target company.
Finally, in the relatively unlikely event that merger negotiations
are taking place contemporaneously with a proxy solicitation for a
company subject to the Exchange Act's reporting requirements, the
full disclosure requirements of the proxy rules would come into
play.57 The weight of authority favors the view that negligence is
sufficient to prove a violation of the federal proxy rules. 58 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has recognized a private damage remedy in
favor of a shareholder injured by misleading proxy solicitation
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
56. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 46 (1977).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986).
58. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299-1301 (2d Cir. 1973); Fradkin v.
Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 843 (N.D. Ohio 1983). But see Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-31 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1981). See
generally T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 11.3.
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materials.59
In sum, there are various provisions of the federal securities
laws that have potential impact in regulating management state-
ments concerning preliminary merger negotiations or statements is-
sued in response to reporters' or analysts' questions. In most cases,
when a question is raised, SEC rule lOb-5 will be the appropriate
provision. Regardless of which provision is applicable, however, the
question of whether there has been an actionable misstatement de-
pends upon a finding of materiality. Materiality is discussed directly
below.
V. MATERIALITY, PRELIMINARY MERGER NEGOTIATIONS,
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, GOING PRIVATE,
AND RUMOR CONTROL
As is the case with any issue regarding disclosure under the se-
curities laws, " 'materiality' is the name of the game."6 ° Thus, it is
necessary to take at least a brief look at the definition of materiality,
as developed by the courts, in order to understand the particulars of
the merger negotiation and rumor response issues.6 ' In its second
attempt to define materiality, the Supreme Court in TSC Industries v.
Northway, Inc.62 declared that materiality of a particular item de-
pends upon a finding of "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important . . . ." The Court further
explained that materiality is to be determined according to the "to-
tal mix" of information. 6' The TSC Industries ruling was decided
under the rules relating to full disclosure in the solicitation of prox-
ies.64 Nonetheless, the Court's test has equal applicability to cases
brought under rule lOb-5's general disclosure requirements, 65 as
59. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
60. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1023
(5th ed. 1982).
61. Seegenerally T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at §§ 11.4, 13.5; Hewitt, Developing Concepts of
Materialilty and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977); Kripke, Rule 1Ob-5 Liability and "Mate-
rial " "Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1971). See also, Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient
Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984).
62. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In its first attempt, the Court stated that materiality
"embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such character that it might have been
considered important by a reasonable shareholder . Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (emphasis added).
63. 426 U.S. at 450. See also Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1138
(D. Or. 1984); Unicorp Fin. Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortgage Inv.,
515 F. Supp. 249, 257-59 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1986).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). See T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 13.5. The same
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well as for disclosures scrutinized under the Williams Act provisions
relating to tender offers.6 6 The SEC has, by use of its rulemaking
power, adopted the same test for materiality with regard to other
required disclosures under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.67
As the foregoing very brief overview of the history of the mate-
riality question demonstrates, the determination of the materiality
of a particular statement and whether it is materially misleading is a
highly factual inquiry. In the words of the Supreme Court:
"[M]ateriality may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact,
involving as it does the application of legal standards to a particular
set of facts."'6 8 In light of the law-and-fact character of materiality, it
would appear that a safe-harbor alternative to full disclosure beyond
the suggested "no comment" would not be feasible without chang-
ing the existing law. A brief examination of the leading recent
merger and rumor control cases further bears this out.
The Third Circuit in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.69 has adopted a
most questionable "price and structure" threshold of materiality in
the context of takeover negotiations. Under this test-even in the
face of market rumors and in the context of responding to ques-
tions-there is no duty to disclose the existence of negotiations
before there has been an agreement on the price and structure of
the deal.7" Accordingly, the court in Greenfield found no violation
based on the issuer's denial of knowledge of any reason for price
increases in its stock, while undisclosed merger negotiations were in
fact taking place. 7'
Applying both the Supreme Court's and SEC's test of material-
ity to the facts of Greenfield, however, there can be no doubt that
there is a substantial likelihood that the reasonable investor would
test of materiality also applies with regard to § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). See T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at § 11.15.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1986) provides: "The term 'material,' when used to
qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the infor-
mation required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able investor would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the
securities registered."
68. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (emphasis added).
69. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
70. Id. at 757. Accord Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1987). See
also Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983)(time of disclosure a
matter of corporate discretion where legally material facts not involved); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982)(no duty to disclose preliminary merger
discussions during tender offer to shareholder).
71. 742 F.2d at 759.
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consider the existence of such negotiations important in determin-
ing whether to buy or sell the stock. Similarly, there is no doubt that
confirmation of the market rumors, as opposed to the apparent de-
nial given by the issuer, would have affected the market price. I re-
fer to this as an apparent denial, because as Commissioner
Grundfest has pointed out, the majority opinion in Greenfield took
the position that the statement provided merely a denial of know-
ledge of any leak to the market that would justify the price rise,
rather than a denial of the existence of the negotiations. 7 2 Commis-
sioner Grundfest has noted, however, that the majority's analysis
can be viewed as "too cute."' 73 As a district court decision has ob-
served in a similar situation, when no facts other than pending ne-
gotiations can be identified as the source of unusual market activity,
then management should assume that there has been a leak.7"
Accordingly, a denial of knowledge of facts accounting for the
market activity could be actionable under rule lOb-5, if made with
scienter. 5 Another court has indicated, however, that when there is
no evidence that the leak, if any, originated from the company, a
denial of knowledge of "corporate developments that would ac-
count for the surge in trading" will not be in violation of rule IOb-5,
although private merger negotiations were in fact taking place.76
The foregoing rumor control cases point out the highly factual na-
ture of the inquiry, which may result in apparent inconsistencies by
the courts. Since materiality requires each case to be determined
according to its own facts, though, any attempt to strive for certainty
through a safe harbor rule for disclosures would have unfortunate
results. It is contrary to an efficient market to permit denials in the
face of facts known by management to be of significance to inves-
tors. Knowing dissemination of misinformation cannot be justified
on the basis that merger negotiations are preliminary, and there has
not yet been an agreement as to price and structure.
The price and structure threshold thus seems to be a less strin-
gent test of materiality than the one provided by relevant precedent.
72. See Grundfest, supra note 25, at 13.
73. Id. (referring to Judge Higgenbotham's dissenting opinion). Accord Etshokin v.
Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
74. Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 128, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. Id. at 134.
76. Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See
also Etshokin, 612 F. Supp. at 1217 (stating that there was no duty "to determine whether
there actually was a reason for the trading activity in its stock apart from reasons of
which the company knew"); Weintraub v. Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466, 1470
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding no duty to investigate source of unusual trading).
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It must be remembered that the issue here is not the higher thresh-
old that is necessary to find a violation of an affirmative duty to dis-
close, 77 but rather the accuracy of a disclosure once made-that is,
the materially misleading nature of the issuer's apparent denial of
the existence of negotiations.78
The Third Circuit's price and structure test does, of course,
present a safe harbor. As pointed out above, however, it does so at
the sacrifice of the existing law on materiality. The overly lenient
approach of the Third Circuit has led a number of courts and the
SEC to seek an alternative test. Shortly after the Third Circuit's
pronouncement, the SEC took the position that the case was
"wrongly decided,"" a position that has been reaffirmed in subse-
quent SEC amicus briefs.80
Similarly, a number of courts have either rejected or seriously
questioned the Third Circuit's price and structure threshold of ma-
teriality. The Sixth Circuit has rejected the threshold because such
a rule disregards the highly factual nature of any materiality in-
quiry." The Ninth Circuit has observed that the materiality of pre-
liminary merger negotiations depends upon the facts of each
particular situation rather than upon a per se rule.8 2 The court also
noted that it is significant whether the statements were made with
regard to face-to-face transactions as opposed to open market trans-
actions."s Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has held that the price
and structure threshold will not be applied as a per se rule in the
context of a closely held corporation. 84 The Third Circuit's per se
77. The threshold for triggering an affirmative duty to disclose is much higher. See,
e.g., Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
1284 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985). See also
T. HAZEN, supra note 3, at §§ 11.15, 13.10; Bauman, Rule JOb-5 and the Corporation's Af-
firmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979); Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative
Duty to Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans,
40 Bus. LAw. 1243 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 36.
78. See, e.g., Levinson, 786 F.2d at 747-48 (finding statement that management was
unaware of merger negotiations when in fact some were taking place, albeit of a prelimi-
nary nature, to be materially misleading).
79. In the Matter of Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.8 (July 8, 1985). Com-
missioner Grundfest obviously is correct in his support of the Commission's ability (and,
perhaps, even obligation) to question what it believes to be a questionable circuit or
district court interpretation of the securities laws. See Grundfest, supra note 25, at 7-8.
80. See Grundfest, supra note 25, at 6.
81. See Levinson, 786 F.2d at 748.
82. Grigsby v. CMI Corp., 765 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. (citing Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1975)).
84. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1987); Michaels v.
Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986).
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price and structure threshold has thus been far from universally ac-
cepted. However, in its most recent decision, the Seventh Circuit
has adopted the Third Circuit's price and structure threshold
outside of the closely-held context.8 5 The Supreme Court's grant-
ing of certiorari in the Levinson case 86 presents the opportunity for
resolving the conflict between the circuits.
The SEC's opinion in In the Matter of Carnation Co. 7 is neither a
drastic new development nor does it present a bright-line solution to
the problem."8 The Carnation opinion merely reaffirms the tradi-
tional approach to materiality. The view expressed in Carnation,
which has been adopted by some courts, 9 suggests the wisdom of a
"no comment" response. Then, after the essence of the proposed
transaction has been agreed upon by both sides, or after manage-
ment has in the exercise of its business judgment determined that
negotiations are sufficiently advanced, full disclosure is appropriate.
VI. FULL DISCLOSURE OR "No COMMENT"-THE ONLY
VIABLE ALTERNATIVES
Commissioner Grundfest has suggested that "even a little bit of
accurate information-as long as it is not part of a plan to deceive or
mislead the market-is better than a deafening 'no comment.' -90
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Easterbrook has taken the
same approach. 9 ' There can be no doubt as to the truth of this view
so far as it goes. In most cases, however, a statement that has the
effect of disguising or hiding preliminary negotiations is designed to
deceive. Typically, the person speaking on the issuer's behalf is not
making the denial out of ignorance of the true facts,92 but rather
because of a determination that the negotiations taking place are in
85. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169,1177-78 (7th Cir. 1987).
86. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
87. Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,801 (July 8, 1985).
88. Grundfest, supra note 25, at 4-6.
89. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284
(1987).
90. Grundfest, supra note 25, at 14.
91. "If by hypothesis silence is the best course for investors, then it may be necessary
to condone evasive answers, as the Third Circuit did in Greenfield, to put pursuers off the
scent for a time." Flarnrn, 814 F.2d at 1178.
92. Thus, the typical merger negotiation or rumor denial situation is quite different
from Commissioner Grundfest's "Baby Doc" example. See Grundfest, supra note 25, at
10. Furthermore, even in the absence of scienter, negligence may form the basis of
liability under § 17(a)(2)-(3) of the 1933 Act and § 14(a) of the 1934 Act. See supra notes
51-59 and accompanying text.
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too early a stage to be material. Accordingly, in such a case the
speaker knowingly withholds information from the market and,
therefore, does so with the requisite scienter.93 Even beyond such
omissions made with scienter, a materially misleading statement that
has been negligently prepared, under appropriate facts, may be the
basis for liability under other provisions of the securities laws.
As noted above, sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities
Act of 1933"4 are violated by negligently made, material misstate-
ments issued in connection with the offer or sale of securities. 5 In
the context of a rumored takeover or pending merger negotiations,
however, section 17(a)'s "in connection with" requirement may be
more difficult to satisfy than under rule 10b-5, which applies to
purchases or sales. 6 In addition to the negligence standard under
section 17(a), negligence is sufficient for a violation of the proxy
rules' general antifraud provision. 7 It should further be noted that,
although the few cases on point have indicated otherwise, there is an
argument that negligence can form the basis of a violation of the
Williams Act's general antifraud provision-section 14(e) 9 8-which
applies to statements issued in connection with a tender offer.99
Even aside from the scienter issue, any safe harbor short of the
alternatives of "no comment" or full disclosure of the negotiations,
regardless of how preliminary, would encourage premature disclo-
sure, which in turn would be likely to mislead, add to rumors, and
thus act against an informed and efficient market. Silence or "no
comment" may lead to lack of information, but rumors with cryptic
issuer responses are likely to lead to a market fueled by speculation
rather than accurate information. Accordingly, any alternative to
''no comment" or full disclosure is undesirable as it would be likely
to hamper the market's attempt to be an efficient filter and evaluator
of information. When an inquiry emanates from a securities
93. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (1982).
95. See generally Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of Rule lOb-5: Implied Remedies and
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REV. 641 (1978); Steinberg, Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Reddington, 68 GEo. LJ. 163 (1979). See supra
text accompanying notes 51-54.
96. For discussion of the "in connection with" requirement, see T. HAZEN, supra note
3, at § 13.6.
97. See sources cited supra note 58.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
99. Clearly, many rumors and merger negotiations do not arise in connection with a
tender offer. Section 14(e), however, would apply to merger negotiations with a "white
knight" sought out to save the target from a hostile tender offer.
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exchange, "no comment" may not be appropriate' 00 and full disclo-
sure may then be the only option.' 0 ' In such a case the exchange
officials may elect to permit public silence if the negotiations are still
preliminary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Full and fair disclosure fuels investor confidence in securities.
The disclosure and antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws are designed to strengthen the integrity of the marketplace.
Furthermore, under the currently in-vogue efficient capital market
hypothesis, 0 2 stock prices reflect expert analysts' evaluation of the
totality of information available. A more efficient market would
have a significant impact in controlling the volatile price swings fre-
quently taking place in today's securities markets. The volatility in-
fused into the market by the quest for takeover and other deal
candidates is exacerbated by disclosure rules that tolerate the injec-
tion of half-truths and misinformation into the market. In the face
of rumors or pending negotiations, any response other than full dis-
closure or "no comment" will add to, rather than correct, the cur-
rent market inefficiencies.
100. In the words of judge Easterbrook:
Suppose a firm is engaged in negotiations that are best kept quiet, and the
Exchange asks whether new developments account for activity in its stock. If
the firm says yes and says why, the cat is out of the bag; if the firm says no, it
faces liability for fraud; if the firm says "no comment" that is the same thing as
saying "yes" because investors will deduce the truth. No corporation follows
the CIA's policy of saying "no comment" to every inquiry; every firm regularly
confirms or denies rumors, as the securities laws and the stock exchanges' rules
require. The exchanges' rule require a response, not a refusal to respond, to
inquiries.
Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1178.
101. See id.
102. See authorities cited supra notes 7-8.
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